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Abstract: This paper makes an argument for the democratic value of distrust.  It begins by analyzing 
distrust, since distrust is not merely the negation of trust. The account that it develops is based primarily on 
Martin Luther King Jr.’s work in Why We Can’t Wait.  On this view, distrust is the confident belief that 
another individual or group of individuals or an institution will not act justly or as justice requires. It is a 
narrow normative account of distrust, since it concerns a specific normative task. Distinctions between 
vertical and horizontal distrust, as well as trust and agnostic trust will also be discussed. This paper argues 
that distrust’s democratic value lies in its ability to secure democracy by protecting political minorities 
from having their voices ignored. As such, distrust can be viewed as a kind of Madisonian “check and 
balance” that works to prevent tyranny. Distrust also works to secure democracy by forging new or 
alternative forms of democratic participation. The main example discussed in this paper is King’s 
involvement in the Birmingham Campaign during the Black Civil Rights movement in America. In this 
case, King and his supporters’ distrust of fellow White citizens and political institutions led to alternative 
forms of political expression such as non-violent protests, boycotts, and other forms of civil disobedience, 
all of which led to greater racial justice by working to alleviate White tyranny. 
 
§1.  Introduction 
 
Recently, a number of scholars have argued that trust is essential to a well-
functioning democracy.1 Yet, despite its potentially close relation to trust, very little 
attention has been given to the value of distrust among democratic theorists.2 In part this 
is because of the tendency among democratic theorists to focus on the democratic value 
                                                
* I am very grateful for detailed written feedback from two anonymous reviewers and Elizabeth Anderson 
and for comments from audiences at Western University and the Central APA Symposium on Oppression.   
1 For a few recent examples, see the selections in Mark Warren (ed.) Democracy and Trust (Cambridge, 
MA: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Patti T. Lenard, “The Decline of Trust, The Decline of 
Democracy?” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 8.3 (2005): 363-378; Shayla 
Nunnaly, Trust in Black America (New York, NY: New York University, 2012); and Sandra Susan Smith, 
“Race and Trust,” Annual Review of Sociology, 36 (2010): 453–475. 
2 There is some discussion of distrust among democratic theorists. For example, Vivien Hart, Distrust and 
Democracy: Political Distrust in Britain and America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); 
Barbara Arneil, Diverse Communities: The Problem with Social Capital (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), see especially pp. 140-144; Patti T. Lenard, Trust, Democracy, and Multicultural 
Challenges (University Park: Penn State Press, 2012); and Russell Hardin, “Liberal Distrust,” European 
Review, 10.1 (2002): 73-89. Similarly, distrust has received some attention in the empirical literature on 
democracy. See James M. Avery, “Political Mistrust Among African Americans and Support for the 
Political System,” Political Research Quarterly, 62.1 (2009): 132-145; James M. Avery, “The Sources and 
Consequences of Political Mistrust Among African Americans,” American Politics Research, 34.5 (2006): 
653-682. Furthermore, while it has not been a central topic of discussion, there has been some discussion of 
distrust in the general philosophical literature. See Trudy Govier, “Distrust as a Practical Problem,” Journal 
of Social Philosophy 23.1 (1992): 52–63; Trudy Govier, Social Trust and Human Communities (McGill-
Queens, 1997); Russell Hardin (ed.), Distrust (Russell Sage Foundation: New York, 2004); Edna Ullmann-
Margalit, “Trust out of Distrust,” The Journal of Philosophy, 99.10 (2002): 532-548; Katherine Hawley, 
“Trust, Distrust, and Commitment,” Nous 48.1 (2014): 1-20.   
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of positive attitudes such as trust, solidarity, and empathy.3 Little emphasis has been 
placed on the so-called negative attitudes such as anger and despair and their potential 
value for democracy. Distrust is usually counted as a negative attitude and is often 
considered a threat to democracy.  
Additionally, one might conjecture that a theory of distrust is not needed. Once 
we have an account of trust at hand, we can simply define distrust as the negation of 
whatever trust turns out to be; and, to the extent that trust is valuable, it will follow that 
distrust is not valuable. This seems straightforward enough. However, things are not so 
straightforward. As Edna Ullmann-Margalit aptly argues, distrust is not simply the 
opposite of trust.4 One can not-trust an individual without thereby distrusting her. If I do 
not-trust you, this could mean that I have positive reasons to distrust you. Or, it could 
mean that I have no reason to trust (or distrust) you. In this sense, I might be agnostic 
about trust in relation to you. Furthermore, if distrust was simply the opposite of trust, 
then saying that “I do not distrust you” would mean that I trust you. This, however, 
would be in stark contrast with common usage of the term. If distrust is not merely the 
negation of trust, then the value of distrust cannot be determined merely by determining 
the value of trust or the disvalue of the lack of trust. Distrust is worthy of consideration in 
its own right for conceptual and normative reasons. 
The main aim of this paper is to offer an account of distrust. The account is 
derived from Martin Luther King Jr.’s writings in Why We Can’t Wait. I aim to show not 
only that it is a plausible account of distrust but also, through detailed textual analysis, 
that it is an account that can properly be said to be King’s. I argue that distrust – in 
King’s sense – is a narrow normative concept. In order for A to distrust B, A must have a 
confident belief that B will not act justly. It is a narrow concept because it concerns a 
specific task. It is a normative concept because it concerns beliefs about what individuals 
ought to do.  
The argument for this account of distrust differs from others in two respects.  
First, instead of the usual trend in analytic conceptual analysis, I will not spend time 
explaining why the concept that I argue for here is the best account of distrust (or better 
than the other proposed accounts). I will argue in favour of this account by showing that 
it is politically useful or valuable. It is likely that there are a wide variety of concepts of 
distrust (and trust) available to us. The underlying suggestion here is that the concepts 
that we should choose to use, at least in some circumstances, are the ones that are 
politically useful or valuable.5 The account that I propose here is one such account. There 
may be others. 
                                                
3 I have argued that political solidarity is of value to a just society. See Meena Krishnamurthy, “Political 
Solidarity, Justice, and Public Health,” Public Health Ethics 6.1 (2013): 129-141. Nussbaum argues for the 
democratic value of love in Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2013); and Sharon Krause argues for the democratic value of sympathy in Civil Passions 
Moral Sentiments and Democratic Deliberations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
4 “Trust, Distrust and In Between” in Russell Hardin (ed.), Distrust (Russell Sage Foundation: New York, 
2004). 
5 I see my paper as a contribution to the growing field of conceptual ethics. On this see Alexis Burgess and 
David Plunkett, “Conceptual Ethics 1,” Philosophy Compass 8.12 (2013): 1091-1101; and Alexis Burgess 
and David Plunkett, “Conceptual Ethics 2,” Philosophy Compass 8.12 (2013): 1102-1110. Burgess and 
Plunkett argue that a variety of values or goods are operative in conceptual ethics (the ethics of concept 
selection), including those of social justice and justice more generally. Here I am suggesting that 
democratic values ought to be a criterion for concept selection, at least when one is concerned with the 
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This takes us to the secondary aim of this paper, which is to make an argument for 
the democratic value of distrust. Because of the lack of attention paid to distrust by 
democratic theorists, its potential value for democracy has been ignored. This paper 
argues that distrust’s value lies in its ability to secure democracy by protecting political 
minorities from tyranny. As such, distrust can be viewed as a kind of Madisonian “check 
and balance” in a political system – something that is commonly viewed as being 
essential to the maintenance of democracy. The main example discussed in this paper is 
the Black Civil Rights movement in America. I argue that Black citizens’ distrust of 
fellow White citizens and political institutions led to new forms of political expression 
such as non-violent protests, sit-ins, boycotts, and child demonstrations that were 
essential to securing greater racial justice and a more genuine form of democracy. I use 
this case to distinguish primarily between horizontal distrust (between citizens) and 
vertical distrust (between citizens and institutions). The argument given here is a causal 
one: Black citizen’s sense of distrust (in both senses) caused or led them to engage in 
unique actions that promoted democracy by challenging (White) tyranny. This is why I 
give a detailed account of the Birmingham campaign and what led up to it. 
Few of the philosophers who write on distrust note, even in passing, that the 
concept of distrust is of great importance in American history. Rather, they explore the 
concept in abstraction, divorcing it from its social significance.6 This paper attempts to 
fill this gap, and in the process to highlight the role that the concept of distrust played in 
African Americans’ fight against racial injustice during the mid-twentieth century. It is 
written with the hope that it will not only contribute to philosophical discussions of 
distrust and King’s work more broadly but that it will also contribute to the study of 
racial injustice and genuine democracy in America. That it brings together these matters 
is the central unique contribution of the paper. I close by drawing out the significance of 
distrust to the current struggle for racial justice in America. 
 
 
§2. King’s Distrust  
 Slavery had officially ended in 1865. Yet, institutionalized racism continued to 
oppress Black citizens in America even in the mid-20th century.7 Black citizens were still 
forced to use public utilities and schools that were separate from White citizens. Black 
citizens suffered from discrimination in employment and housing. They suffered from 
                                                                                                                                            
political aptness of a concept. I am not arguing that it is the only criterion by which to judge concepts or 
even that it is most important one. I am only suggesting that it is an important criterion. 
6 Exceptions to this trend can be found. See for example, “In my next life, I’ll be White,” Ebony, Dec., 
1990, Laurence Thomas describes in detail how “being black” can be grounds for distrust (available here: 
http://www.laurencethomas.com/NextLife.pdf). Trudy Govier briefly discusses Thomas’s work and related 
topics in Social Trust and Human Communities.  In “Progressive and Regressive Uses of Reasonable 
Distrust,” Journal of Social Philosophy, 28.1 (1997): 87-100, Carl Hedman focuses on warranted distrust, 
arguing that “constituencies that are nonprivileged on one or more important social dimension such as race, 
class, sex – often have good reasons for distrusting the super – privileged.” Russell Hardin, “Liberal 
Distrust,” discusses distrust and its importance to political liberalism, especially in America. 
7 Black activists had already fought against racial segregation with at least some success. For example, in 
1954, the Supreme Court decision Brown v. Board of Education held that state laws requiring racial 
segregation in schools were unconstitutional. However, despite this important victory, racial segregation 
continued. 
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abuse and lynchings.8 Jim Crowe laws such as literacy tests and poll taxes kept Black 
citizens from voting, despite the fact that Black men acquired the legal right to vote in 
1869 and women (White and Black) acquired the legal right to vote in 1920. Martin 
Luther King Jr. opposed racial segregation because he believed that it conveyed a 
denigrating sense of “nobodiness” that was detrimental to Black citizens’ sense of self-
respect (93).9  
 The Birmingham campaign against racial segregation in Alabama began on April 
3, 1963. The campaign was led by King’s Southern Christian Leadership Conference (or 
the SCLC) and its affiliate, the Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights. On 
April 10, 1963, Circuit Judge, W.A. Jenkins issued a temporary injunction against Wyatt 
Tee Walker (Chief of Staff to King and a Board Member of the SCLC), which prohibited 
involvement with “mass street parades or mass processions or like demonstrations 
without a permit” and any other “acts calculated to cause breaches of the peace” in 
Birmingham, Alabama. On April 12, 1963, King was arrested for violating this 
injunction. It was during this time that King wrote the famous “Letter from Birmingham 
Jail.” It was a response to a statement that was written by eight Birmingham clergymen 
who urged Black citizens to withdraw their support from the demonstrations.10 Most of 
King’s response in this letter and related work (some of which is published in Why We 
Can’t Wait) consisted in giving an account of the reasons for why King had to act. This 
discussion brings us to King’s account of distrust. 
From King’s work, we can extract a narrow normative concept of distrust.11 A 
narrow account of distrust concerns distrust as it relates to a specific task, whereas a 
broad account relates to distrust in a more general sense. Roughly, on King’s view, to 
distrust someone is to be confident that she will not act justly. In this particular instance, 
justice required action to promote and ensure racial equality and the end of racial 
segregation. King specifically distrusted White moderates with respect to action 
regarding the promotion of racial justice. King’s account is a normative account of 
distrust because it concerns beliefs about how one should act. King had a confident belief 
that White moderates would not act as they ought to, that is, to promote or secure justice 
or what is right, on their own. 
 The focus of King’s “Letter” is on the White moderate. White moderates are 
White individuals, typically members of the clergy and other Christian groups, who King 
believed held that racial segregation was unjust and ought to end. King’s distrust of 
White moderates lied not in their commitments but rather in their inaction.  He wrote, 
First, I must confess that over the past few years I have been gravely disappointed 
with the white moderate. I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the 
Negro’s great stumbling block in his stride toward freedom is not the White 
Citizens Council or the Ku Klux Klanner, but the white moderate who is more 
devoted to “order” than to justice; who prefers a negative peace which is the 
                                                
8 Lynchings may have been more prolific than originally thought. On this see, Campbell Robinson, 
“History of Lynchings in the South Documents Nearly 4,000 Names,” Feb. 10, 2015, New York Times.  
Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/10/us/history-of-lynchings-in-the-south-documents-nearly-
4000-names.html. 
9 All in-text page references refer to page numbers in Martin Luther King Jr., Why We Can’t Wait (London: 
Signet, 2001). 
10 The statement was published in the Birmingham News. King wrote his letter in the margins of this paper. 
11 On this distinction see Katherine Hawley, “Trust, Distrust, and Commitment,” at p. 1. 
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absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of justice; who 
constantly says, “I agree with you in the goal you seek, but I cannot agree with 
your methods of direct action” (97). 
King made it explicit that his distrust of White moderates lied in his belief that they 
would not engage in the direct action that was needed to promote racial justice. They 
would not act justly. King was confident in his belief. He had what he believed were 
good reasons12 to believe that White moderates would not act on their own initiative to 
promote the equality of Black Citizens. In this sense, he believed that his distrust was 
warranted. 
Why was King confident that White moderates would not act to promote racial 
justice? One might contend that it was because he believed that White moderates had bad 
will toward Black citizens.13 King did not seem to hold this view, however. He was clear 
about his belief that White moderates were sympathetic. He explicitly referred to them as 
having goodwill, writing, for example, that the “ultimate tragedy of Birmingham was not 
the brutality of the bad people, but the silence of the good people” (48).  
King was careful to layout the reasons for why he believed that good people, such 
as the White moderates who had good will toward Black citizens, might fail to act.14 
Much of the time, King chalked up their inaction to a lack of understanding: 
I had hoped that the white moderate would see this need. Perhaps I was too 
optimistic; perhaps I expected too much. I suppose I should have realized that few 
members of the oppressor race can understand the deep groans and passionate 
yearnings of the oppressed race, and still fewer have the vision to see that 
injustice must be rooted out by strong, persistent and determined action (103).15 
He also noted that fear played an important role, suggesting that the White moderate 
dreaded “change” and was afraid of “social ostracism” and economic and political 
reprisal (48). 
 At other times, however, he accused White moderates of being irrational: 
                                                
12 Whether his distrust is warranted will depend on whether, objectively, these reasons are sound. Given the 
state of affairs at the time, his reasons for his belief seem sound. 
13 Karen Jones, “Trust as an Affective Attitude”, Ethics, 107. 1 (Oct., 1996), pp. 4-25 at pp. 4-5, for 
example, argues that “an attitude of optimism that the goodwill and competence of another will extend to 
cover the domain of our interaction with her, together with the expectation that the one trusted will be 
directly and favorably moved by the thought that we are counting on her.” She sees goodwill as being very 
important to trust. In turn, one might at least be tempted to think that bad will is important to distrust. It 
would seem from the discussion of King’s view that beliefs about the bad will of the other agent are not 
necessary for distrust. Though, such beliefs may play a role. 
14 It is likely that King’s distrust of White moderates was not categorical.  For example, it was not the same 
as his distrust of the KKK, where he expected total opposition from beginning to end. One could argue that 
King’s overall strategy was predicated on the expectation that White moderates would be brought along to 
support the movement’s demands if they were put under enough moral pressure.  Otherwise, why would 
King bother address arguments (in the “Letter”) to them at all? 
15 It is important to note that King did not think that White moderates were doomed to inaction. He thanked 
a number of “white brothers in the South” who had “grasped the meaning of this social revolution and 
committed themselves to it” (103). These were people who not only wrote in support of racial equality, but 
also “recognized the urgency of the moment and sensed the need for powerful ‘action’ antidotes to combat 
the diseases of segregation” (103). These statements demonstrate that King believed that White moderates 
were capable of action to promote justice. He was just confident in his belief that most of White moderates 
would not act in such a way on their own. 
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In your statement you assert that our actions, even though peaceful, must be 
condemned because they precipitate violence. But is this a logical assertion? . . .  
Isn’t this like condemning Socrates because his unswerving commitment to truth 
and his philosophical inquiries precipitated the act by the misguided populace in 
which they made him drink hemlock (98).   
It was irrational, in his view, to condemn non-violent action simply because it might 
cause others, namely, the police, to act violently.   
As this discussion indicates, in most of his criticism of White moderates, King 
placed emphasis on their unwillingness to “act” and not on their reasons for failing to act. 
This is largely because his letter was written to those whom he deemed “moderates,” 
those who had the right reasons for acting (i.e., they believed that justice required racial 
equality) but still failed to act. Their flaw, in his view, was their passivity. This was the 
basis of King’s distrust. He distrusted White moderates because he believed with a high 
degree of certainty or was confident in his belief that they would not, on their own, act as 
justice required.  
His distrust of the White moderates was quite different from his distrust of Bull 
Connor, the Police commissioner in Birmingham, or members of the Ku Klux Klan 
(KKK), who one could argue, were of bad will, since they believed in racial segregation 
and racial inequality and consistently acted to uphold them. However, even here it is 
unclear whether King truly believed that they had bad will toward Black citizens or 
whether he believed that they too were victims of misunderstanding. 
We also get at least a beginning sense of what trust was for King when we 
consider his response to some of those who argued in favour of Connor. Some of the 
clergymen that King was responding to claimed that Connor acted justly by reacting non-
violently toward King and the other protestors. King responded by arguing that Connor 
engaged in violent behavior. He used dogs that mauled at least one small child (74) and a 
number of “unarmed” Black citizens (109). However, King granted that the police, under 
Connor, showed at least some restraint in handling the demonstrators. So, at least in some 
sense, King was confident that Connor would to, some degree, constrain his actions 
within the bounds of justice. Even so, this did not mean that King trusted Connor. King 
believed that Connor acted this way for strategic rather than moral reasons. King 
suggested that Connor restrained himself in public largely because he believed (following 
Police Chief Laurie Pritchett of Albany) that non-violent action was the only way to 
defeat the demonstrations (76, 110) and, in turn, to preserve the system of racial 
segregation. He was also awaiting the court injunction directing King to cease his 
activities (76). Connor, he argued, was a segregationist, dedicated to the maintenance of 
the (racist) status quo (91).16 Belief that someone would engage in right action was not 
sufficient for trust, on King’s view. Right action for strategic reasons was not enough to 
give King positive reasons for trusting Connor. To trust someone, on King’s view, was to 
believe that they would not only act justly but also that they would act justly for the right 
reasons. However, the opposite is not true of distrust. One can rightfully distrust another 
person even if one merely believes that she is unlikely to act justly or rightly. As King’s 
discussion of the White moderate highlights, one can be agnostic or at least unsure about 
                                                
16 He also describes Connor as a “racist who prided himself on knowing how to handle the Negro and keep 
him in his place” (47). 
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their reasons (there may be many potential candidates) for failing to act justly, while still 
being confident about their tendency toward such a failure in action. 
  Contrasting King’s discussion of Bull Connor with that of White moderates 
allows us to identify a further distinction in types of distrust. King’s distrust of Connor 
was not restricted to Connor as a man, but was also very much related to Connor as a 
man of the administration. King explained that he was ready to protest even if Connor 
was not elected as the new Mayor. Indeed, the Birmingham campaign initiated just after a 
new city administration was elected, before it had much time to act. In explaining why 
this was the case, King wrote,  
the new Birmingham administration must be prodded about as much as the 
outgoing one, before it will act. We are sadly mistaken if we feel that the election 
of Albert Boutwell as mayor will bring the millennium to Birmingham. While Mr. 
Boutwell is a much more gentle person than Mr. Connor, they are both 
segregationists, dedicated to the maintenance of the status quo. I have hoped that 
Mr. Boutwell will be reasonable enough to see the futility of massive resistance to 
desegregation. But he will not see this without pressure from devotees of civil 
rights (90-91). 
Here, King expressed his belief that Boutwell, the newly elected mayor, was a more 
gentle person than Connor. But King was still doubtful that such gentleness was 
sufficient to move Boutwell to act justly. His distrust of Boutwell concerned Boutwell as 
a person. King believed that Boutwell was committed to the status quo and the 
maintenance of White supremacy. However, King’s distrust was more about Boutwell as 
a member of the privileged White community. King writes, “[l]amentably, it is an 
historical fact that privileged groups seldom give up their privileges voluntarily . . . 
groups tend to be more immoral than individuals” (91). King’s distrust was also about 
Boutwell as a representative of the Birmingham administration, an administration King 
believed to be representative of the nation as a whole and of its nationally 
institutionalized racism. King wrote, “[a] campaign in Birmingham would surely be the 
toughest fight of our civil-rights careers, it could, if successful, break the back of 
segregation all over the nation. The city has been the country’s chief symbol of racial 
intolerance. A victory there might well set forces in motion to change the entire course of 
the drive for freedom and justice” (53-54).   
Using King’s thoughts here, we can distinguish between the distrust that 
individuals have toward one another, qua individual citizens, and the distrust that 
individuals have toward political institutions and the individuals, qua instruments of such 
institutions, that have power over them. Call the former horizontal and the latter vertical 
distrust. King’s distrust of Connor can be and was likely best described as a species of 
vertical distrust. We can also derive, from King’s writing, a concept of social distrust: 
distrust that individuals have toward one another as members of a particular social group 
(i.e., “the privileged” or “White”). Social distrust can overlap with either horizontal or 
vertical distrust. For example, King distrusted White moderates not only as individuals 
but also as members of the social group “Whites” and, potentially, also as individuals 
who had more political power than him and other Black citizens. The various types of 
distrust are linked through their connection to one’s belief about various entities’ 
tendency to fail to act justly.   
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From this theory of distrust, we can also derive at least an initial account of trust 
and agnostic trust. To trust is to be confident that a person, group, or institution will act 
justly for the right reasons. To be agnostic about trust/distrust, in relation to an individual, 
group, or an institution, is to be unsure about whether she or it will act justly or not – it is 




§3. The Consequences and Value of Distrust 
 
King’s account of distrust is a narrow normative account. Distrust is a confident 
belief that other individuals, groups, or institutions will not act as justice requires. It is the 
normative aspect of this concept that gives rise to its democratic value. In the case we are 
considering here, that of the Birmingham Campaign, it is King and his supporters’ 
confident belief that White moderates will not act justly, that is, to bring about racial 
justice, that propelled them into action, action that ultimately changed the democratic 




In September 1963, King met with the leaders of Birmingham’s economic 
community. During these negotiations, promises were made by store merchants to 
remove “the stores’ humiliating racial signs” (88). As a result, all demonstrations were 
halted. However, King writes, 
as the weeks and months went by, we realized we were the victims of a broken 
promise. A few signs briefly removed, returned; the others remained. As in so 
many past experiences, our hopes had been blasted, and the shadow of our 
disappointment settled upon us. We had no alternative except to prepare for direct 
action whereby we would present our very bodies as a means of laying our case 
before the conscience of the local and national community (88).  
King’s distrust of the White moderates reached its height after the negotiations with the 
merchants of Birmingham failed. After this, King became very confident in his belief that 
White moderates – even those who were willing to engage in negotiations – would not 
act justly. It was this belief that led him to initiate a campaign of direct action in 
Birmingham.17  
 King believed that direct action was essential to ensuring racial justice. Direct 
action is action that is taken by an individual or a group to reveal an existing social 
problem or a possible solution to an existing social problem. Following Gandhi, King 
believed in non-violent direct action. King believed that non-violent direct action was 
necessary to bring about negotiation and peaceful discussion in Birmingham (89). This 
was the purpose of direct action, in his view. It forced those who constantly refused to 
                                                
17 He takes on the objection that this was not the right time for action, responding with “I have yet to 
engage in a direct-action campaign that was ‘well-timed’ in the view of those who have not suffered unduly 
from the disease of segregation. For years now I have heard the word ‘Wait!’ It rings in the ear of every 
Negro with piercing familiarity. This ‘Wait’ has almost always meant ‘Never.’ We must come to see, with 
one of our distinguished jurists, that ‘justice too long delayed is justice denied’” (91). 
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negotiate to confront the social issue of racism by dramatizing the issue so that it could 
no longer be ignored (89). King also noted that, in this particular case, direct action had 
the positive side-effect of economic-withdrawal and would, in turn, send a direct message 
to the merchants. 
 King’s distrust led to a unique plan for engaging in direct action. Initially, efforts 
were limited to sit-ins. King and his supporters felt it best to begin modestly and then to 
build up to something more spectacular. Small groups of Black citizens sat in at lunch 
counters in the downtown department stores and drugstores. When they were asked to 
leave and refused to do so, they were arrested under the “trespass after warning” 
ordinance (63). King was not able to attend these sit-ins himself.18 Though, he did lecture 
on the philosophy of non-violence and its methods at the nightly meetings that followed 
the demonstrations (64). 
 Shortly after the sit-ins began, King and his supporters started training for the 
more intense forms of direct action. King’s plan was for himself and other Black citizens 
to submit to being jailed – something that had never been done on such a large scale on 
American soil before. He wrote,  
let us not fear going to jail. If the officials threaten to arrest us for standing up for 
our rights, we must answer by saying that we are willing and prepared to fill up 
the jails of the South. Maybe it will take this willingness to stay in jail to arouse 
the dozing conscience of our nation.19 
In preparation, King and his supporters organized and participated in a series of 
workshops on non-violence, which, among other things, involved being ready to endure 
physical and verbal abuse as well as being in jail (67). They engaged in other preparatory 
work – the running of errands and making phone calls (67). Each volunteer signed a 
“Commitment Card” that pledged, among other things, to always seek justice, to never 
use violence, and to walk and talk in love. 
On April 6, 1963, the first wave of demonstrators marched on City Hall, just as 
they had been trained to do. When they were a few blocks from Connor’s offices, “they 
stood firmly and refused to obey Connor’s orders to disperse. Thereupon forty-two were 
arrested for ‘parading without a permit’” (75). From here, the demonstrations grew 
stronger. The boycott of downtown merchants became more and more effective. King 
writes, “a few days before Easter, a careful check showed less than twenty Negroes 
entering all the stores in the downtown area” (75). The number of volunteers had grown, 
which allowed for a variety of kneel-ins, sit-ins and marches. All of which meant, “the 
jails were slowly but steadily filling up” (76). The demonstrations reached their height on 
April 12, 1963, when King lead a demonstration and submitted himself to arrest. King 
writes, “As we neared the downtown area, Bull Connor ordered his men to arrest us.  
Ralph [Abernathy, King’s staunch supporter] and I were hauled off by two muscular 
policemen, clutching the backs of our shirts in handfuls . . . In jail, Ralph and I were 
separated from everyone else and later from each other” (82). King was subjected to 
solitary confinement.   
                                                
18 King did participate in lunch counter sit-ins at Rich’s department store in Atlanta, Georgia, where he and 
300 students were arrested, in October 1960. 
19 Martin Luther King Jr., “Creative Protest,” Feb. 16, 1960. Available at: http://mlk-
kpp01.stanford.edu/index.php/encyclopedia/documentsentry/a_creative_protest/ 
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King and Abernathy were released on April 20, 1963, which was 8 days after their 
initial imprisonment. Shortly after this, King and James Bevel, the organizer of the 
SCLC, worked out a new tactic: the use of children (or minors) in demonstrations. 
Children were an untapped resource. Until this point, most of the demonstrators in 
Birmingham were adults, many of whom were now in jail. Children were needed to 
sustain the demonstration under such conditions. After Bevel and his associates held 
recruiting sessions, where teenagers and high school students were invited to attend after-
school meetings at churches, “by the fifties and by the hundreds, these youngsters 
attended mass meetings and training sessions” (114). King’s desire to use children in the 
demonstrations was not merely strategic. He also wished to give these children a sense of 
their “own stake in freedom and justice” (114).   
On May 2, 1963, hundreds of children between the ages of 6-18 were arrested for 
attempting to march into downtown Birmingham. King says, “for the first time . . . we 
were able to put into effect the Gandhian principle: ‘Fill up the jails’ . . . At the height of 
the campaign . . . there were 2,500 demonstrators in jail at one time, a large proportion of 
them children” (117). Until this point, Connor had remained fairly docile. However, 
things changed after the May 2 demonstrations. The next day, when hundreds of students 
returned, Connor started using more forceful tactics to halt the demonstrations, directing 
local police and fire departments to blast the protestors with high pressure hoses (118).  
Children were hit hard with the blasts of water, causing many of them to fall down in the 
streets. They were also clubbed by police officers and attacked by dogs.20 The media 
captured images of these clashes. They were printed in newspapers and broadcasted over 
the television to the rest of the nation, who viewed in shock.   
This was a turning point in the Birmingham campaign. King wrote,  
Strangely enough, the masses of white citizens in Birmingham were not fighting 
us. Only a year or so ago, had we begun such a campaign, Bull Connor would 
have had his job done for him by murderously angry white citizens. Now, 
however, the majority were maintaining a strictly hands-off policy” (119).   
White citizens may not have shared in King’s cause, but the majority were no longer 
actively fighting against it. It was a significant shift in attitude. King recounts that even 
Connor’s own men were affected by the demonstrations, refusing, at least in one case, to 
hose down Black citizens (120). All of this national attention and pressure culminated in 
negotiations, starting May 4, 1963,21 which ultimately led President John F. Kennedy to 
propose a civil rights bill in June 1963. President Lyndon Johnson signed this bill into 
law with King and other activists present as the Civil Rights Act on July 2, 1964. Later, 
after the Birmingham Campaign, King would become involved with the March on 
Washington for Jobs and Freedom and the Selma to Montgomery Marches. The demands 
of which were reflected in the Voting Rights Act, which was also initiated by President 
Kennedy and signed into law by President Johnson on August 6, 1965. The Voting Rights 
Act abolished literacy tests and authorized investigation of poll taxes (which were later 
outlawed by the Supreme Court).  It also prohibited certain jurisdictions from 
                                                
20 “Birmingham Campaign 1963.” Available at: http://mlk-
kpp01.stanford.edu/index.php/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_birmingham_campaign/ 
21 The attorney general dispatched Burke Marshall, his chief civil rights assistant, and Joseph F. Dolan, 
assistant deputy attorney general, to negotiate (123). 
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implementing any new voting practices or procedures without receiving preapproval from 
the federal government.  
 In short, King’s campaign for the end of racial segregation and racial injustice 
was successful. It was a sense of distrust of White moderates and those in favour of the 
status quo, such as Connor, as well as the political institutions that implemented racial 
injustice that propelled King and his supporters into a campaign of direct action that used 
new forms of political participation.22 
 
(ii) Value 
 The value of distrust lies in its tendency to bring about justice by tempering 
tyranny.23 Tyranny has always been understood, in America, as among the biggest threats 
to a well functioning democracy. In the Federalists papers, James Madison famously 
worried about factionalism and its effects on democracy within America.24 A faction, in 
his view, “whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole [, are those] who 
are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to 
the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the 
community.” To prevent tyranny, Madison argued that factions must be “unable to 
concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression.”25 We cannot merely rely on 
individuals’ moral or religious motives to ensure justice.26 Like King, Madison expressed 
distrust of those among the majority, believing that they were unlikely to act to promote 
justice merely because of their own inner motivations. Further external motivations were 
necessary. Where there were no further external checks, tyranny was a central threat to a 
genuine democracy (or a “republic” in Madison’s words). Madison argued that, 
representative democracies of this sort, were seats of “turbulence and contention” and 
were “incompatible with personal security or the rights of property”; and in general were 
unstable and unlikely to persist.   
Madison was not only distrustful of factions that formed among ordinary citizens.  
Like John Locke and David Hume, before him, he was distrustful of factions that might 
form within the government itself. Following Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, 
Madison believed that no branch of the government should be centralized in all of its 
powers.27 Madison supported a tripartite system (a separation of powers). However, since 
there would be some overlap in power between the branches, he believed that a tripartite 
system was in itself insufficient to protect against tyranny. He believed that the different 
branches would be jealous of one another and would have a tendency to block each 
other’s usurpations.28 He writes, 
                                                
22 Avery, “Political Mistrust Among African Americans” argues, on empirical grounds, that “greater 
mistrust among blacks leads to greater activity in protest types of participation that are historically rooted in 
the civil rights movement and are often motivated by a strong desire for social and political change” (132).   
23 The value of distrust is likely multifaceted.  I take myself to discuss here only one – if central – aspect of 
its value. 
24 For a complete discussion of Madison’s distrust and its role in the constitution, see Russell Hardin, 
“Liberal Distrust.”  
25 James Madison, Federalist 10, 1788. 
26 Ibid. 
27 “The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive and judicia[l] in the same hands, whether of one, 
a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self–appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very 
definition of tyranny,” James Madison, Federalist No. 51, 1788. 
28 See James Madison, Federalist 47, 1788 and also Russell Hardin,  “Liberal Distrust,” p. 82. 
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If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern 
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In 
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great 
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the 
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the 
people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has 
taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.29 
On the one hand, the government was necessary to prevent individual citizens from 
forming into factions and tyrannizing one another. On the other hand, governments were 
themselves likely to form factions and were also something to be protected against. To 
some extent the people serve this function, but given their own tendency toward 
factionalism, they were not enough to prevent tyranny. For this reason, Madison believed 
that a system of checks and balances – as provided through the constitution and bill of 
rights – would provide “auxiliary precautions” that were necessary to prevent abuses of 
government power. In short, Madison’s support of the constitution and later the bill of 
rights was grounded in a sense of distrust. Because of their tendency toward factionalism, 
he had a confident belief that individual citizens and branches of government would not 
act justly on their own initiative. The threat of factionalism and resulting tyranny needed 
to be checked and balanced by other mechanisms such as a constitution and a bill of 
rights.   
 King’s distrust can be understood both as raising a challenge to Madison’s views 
and as being in general agreement with them. Like Madison, King was distrustful of his 
fellow citizens and of the government. However, he can be understood as believing that 
the Madisonian system of checks and balances (as Madison conceived of it) failed to 
provide a complete solution to the problem of distrust/factionalism.30 Despite the fact that 
a tripartite system, a constitution, and a bill of rights existed, King distrusted his fellow 
citizens (the White moderates) and the political institutions of the time. He was confident 
that they would not act to ensure justice for Black citizens. His distrust suggested that, 
even with a constitution and a bill of rights, the tripartite system was not enough to 
temper the ill tendencies of the people or the government. They simply were not enough 
to protect Black citizens from White tyranny. Viewed in this light, King’s distrust and the 
resulting direct action were a way of checking and balancing White Tyranny and the 
Madisonian system of checks and balances itself.  Direct action was meant to correct for 
the failures of the Madisonian system, which had so grievously failed to ensure justice for 
Black citizens. It was meant to force change in both individuals and institutions by 
encouraging productive and progressive negotiations by ensuring that the voices of Black 
citizens were heard and taken into account and responded to. 
This brings us to the democratic value of distrust. King and other Black citizen’s 
distrust of White moderates and political institutions gave rise to action that directly 
challenged White tyranny in the South and in America more broadly. It did this by giving 
those who had no voice or at least very little voice in democratic politics a voice and by 
                                                
29 Madison, ibid. 
30 The key failure of Federalist 10 was Madison’s excessive confidence that the large scale of the U.S. 
republic would create many diverse factions at cross-purposes with each other, rather than a solid majority 
faction with continuous tyrannical aims. He clearly did not see racial solidarity of the White majority, 
united across numerous issues against the Black minority, as a dangerous source of tyranny. 
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ensuring that this voice was registered. And, it did this by giving rise to new forms of 
political participation such as passive resistance, marches, sit-ins, teach-ins, child 
demonstrations – all of which had not happened before on such a large scale in American 
history. In this way, direct action and the distrust it stemmed from checked and brought 
back into balance a system that had long been lopsided. In short, distrust led to new forms 
of democratic participation that worked as “auxiliary precautions” against abuses of 
power at both the individual and governmental level. Distrust serves democracy by 
tempering tyranny through direct action. In this sense, distrust itself can be viewed as an 
essential part of the Madisonian system of checks and balances. 
The value of distrust is primarily motivational: distrust motivated Black citizens 
and their supporters to engage in new forms of action that would work to ensure racial 
justice. Its value is contingent. The connection between distrust and being so motivated is 
not a necessary one, but it is a tight one. If King had continued to trust White moderates, 
then political change would likely not have come or, at least, would have come very 
much later. It is King’s confident belief that White moderates would not act justly and 
that Bull Connor and other avatars of institutionalized racism would continue to act 
unjustly that motivated him to take things into his own hands. It is why he couldn’t wait 
any longer.   
 
§4. Conclusion  
 
Many theorists have focused on the democratic value of positive attitudes such as 
trust, solidarity, and empathy.31 In contrast, little emphasis has been placed on the so-
called negative attitudes of anger, aggression, and despair and their potential value for 
democracy. Distrust is usually counted as a negative attitude and is often considered a 
threat to democracy. For example, Patti T. Lenard argues that “the more distrust prevails, 
and the deeper it runs, the more we need to worry about our democracies.” 32 This paper 
takes a different track by arguing for the value of distrust. Using King’s arguments and 
the Birmingham campaign as my focus, I have argued that distrust is of democratic value. 
Its value is motivational. It has a tendency to motivate individuals to engage in the 
actions that are needed to ensure a just democracy. Distrust played an essential 
motivating role in King’s fight to end White tyranny in America. It motivated a largely 
successful campaign of direct action that was aimed at ending racial segregation and also, 
eventually, at ensuring greater political equality and justice more broadly for Black 
citizens. Distrust also motivated the creation of the Madisonian system. In this sense, 
distrust is not merely a negative attitude. It can be productive and protective in the face of 
tyranny and injustice. 
                                                
31 See n. 5. 
32 Lenard, Trust Democracy and Multicultural challenges, p. 62. In chapter 3, Lenard argues against the 
claim that distrust is central to democracy. She argues instead that trust is central to democracy and that 
distrust is a threat to democracy. The argument here is not meant to undermine the claim that trust is central 
to democracy. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere, see n. 4, that trust is essential to a just and democratic 
society because of the role that it plays in political solidarity. The claim here is that a sense of distrust is 
also of central important to a just and well-functioning democracy. This is something that is usually denied. 
There is, of course, the further question of how to balance the two, that is, of how to balance trust and 
distrust, in a democracy. This is an important question, but is not something that I can address within the 
scope of this paper. 
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 There is some truth in the negative views of distrust, however. Distrust may pose 
a threat to democracy. In some cases, it may bread a tendency toward to extremism or 
violence, for example.33 This is likely the case when frustration and cynicism also run 
high. A complete theory of the value of distrust will need to give an account of the 
dangers of distrust. It is important to keep these dangers in mind so that distrust can be 
harbored in ways that ensure that its genuine value is realized.  
All of this is especially worth keeping in mind in the current context. Distrust is 
present in America again and it is taking its effect. Like King and his supporters, today’s 
Black citizens distrust fellow White citizens, including the moderates among them, and 
especially the police. As President Obama suggests, “in too many communities around 
the country, a gulf of mistrust exists between local residents and law enforcement.”34 
And, as Zachery Williams, an associate professor of African-American History at the 
University of Akron in Ohio, recently suggested, “there is this sense that they can’t get 
fairness; that fairness can’t be achieved and accomplished by people of color.”35   
As the situation worsens, Black citizens are becoming more and more confident 
that the police will not act justly. Much of this growing distrust stems from increased 
awareness and acknowledgment of the widespread and consistently poor treatment of 
Black citizens in America. More specifically, there is a growing awareness and 
acknowledgment of the proliferation of unnecessary killings of Black citizens, including 
those of Travvyon Martin, Michael Brown, and Eric Garner. There is also a growing 
awareness and acknowledgment of police profiling of Black citizens especially in small 
towns in America for high court fines and fees on nonviolent offenses such as traffic 
violations. The profits of which are used to bolster the municipal budget.36 A recent 
report by ArchCity Defenders showed that revenue from fines and court fees made up 
about 10 percent of Ferguson’s 2013 budget.37 
The sense of distrust among Black citizens is evidenced in recent Gallup polls. 
Gallup has found, from combined data from 2011-2014, that “Black citizens in the U.S. 
have a significantly lower level of confidence in the police as an institution than do White 
citizens.” 38 50% of Black citizens believe that Black males are more likely to go jail than 
                                                
33 Threads of extremism can be found in King’s work. For a discussion of this aspect of King’s work and 
personality see Jonathan Reider, Gospel of Freedom (Bloomsbury Press, New York, 2013). 
34 “Obama: Ferguson Exposed ‘Gulf of Mistrust’ Between Cops and Communities,” Time, September 28, 
2014. Available at: http://time.com/3441544/obama-ferguson-gulf-of-mistrust/.  The complete transcript of 
Obama’s speech can be found there. 
35 Monsy Alvarado, “Unrest in Ferguson, Mo., fueled by distrust, experts say,” Northjersey.com, Nov. 26, 
2014. Available at: http://www.northjersey.com/news/unrest-in-ferguson-mo-fueled-by-distrust-experts-
say-1.1141921?page=all 
36 Joseph Shapiro, “In Ferguson, Court Fines And Fees Fuel Anger,” NPR, Aug. 25, 2014. Available at: 
http://www.npr.org/2014/08/25/343143937/in-ferguson-court-fines-and-fees-fuel-anger 
37 The report is available here: 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/vwptqn3mhq9xvy7/ArchCity%20Defenders%20Municipal%20Courts%20Whi
tepaper.pdf 
38 Frank Newport, “Gallup Review: Black and White Attitudes Toward Police,” Gallup, Aug. 20, 2014. 
Available at: http://www.gallup.com/poll/175088/gallup-review-black-white-attitudes-toward-
police.aspx?utm_source=tagrss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=syndication&utm_reader=feedly. 
For a summary of the Gallup poll, see Noah Gordon “Americans' Deep Racial Divide on Trusting the 




White males because of racial discrimination.39 Furthermore, the Pew Center has recently 
found that, 76% of Black citizens have little or no confidence at all in the investigations 
of the shootings of individuals such as Eric Garner.40 40% of Black citizens express very 
little confidence in the police to not use excessive force on suspects.41 Finally, “when 
people of both races are asked about their confidence in police around the country to treat 
people of both races equally . . . About half (46%) of Black citizens express very little 
confidence.42 All of this data demonstrates that Black citizens distrust the police.43 They 
have a confident belief that the police will not act justly toward Black citizens.  
As a result of this sense of distrust, campaigns of direct action are beginning. 
There have been mass protests across America in support of Eric Garner and Michael 
Brown, for example. In an attempt to bring greater awareness and to motivate further 
action, there have also been media drives through social networking platforms such as 
Facebook and Twitter with the tag #Blacklivesmatter and #Ican’tbreathe. 
President Obama has committed to addressing “the simmering distrust that exists 
between too many police departments and too many communities of color.” As Mark 
Twain wrote, “actions speak louder than words, but not nearly as often.” So far, Obama’s 
actions have said much less than his words. Let us hope that Black citizens’ sense of 
distrust will grow and continue to foster the direct action that is needed to ensure that 
racial justice and genuine democracy are secured. In a world where Darren Wilson’s run 
free and untempered, and Michael Browns are gunned down, we must hope that the 
distrust of Black citizens will force necessary change and that White Tyranny will finally 
be eliminated.  
 
   
 
 
   
 
                                                
39 Gallup, ibid. 
40 Bruce Drake, “Ferguson highlights deep divisions between blacks and whites in America,” Pew Research 




43 It also suggests that race is an important social factor in distrust. 
